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THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
JEFFREY T KNEBEL *
INTRODUCTIONIN recent years, individuals, companies, corporations and even finan-
cial institutions and cities, connected with the disposal or generation of
hazardous substances, have faced unprecedented liability for pollution.
The passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980,1 commonly known as the
Superfund statute, has added a new dimension to the scope of business
risks associated with owning property or operating a facility where haz-
ardous substances have been released. In addition to property damage
and personal injury suits from third parties, operators and generators are
now liable for the cleanup costs of Superfund sites.2 With this increased
exposure, many companies have been demanding that their liability in-
surers indemnify them for all expenses they incur in cleaning up contami-
nated property.3
The majority of these indemnity claims are based on Comprehensive
(or Commercial) General Liability (CGL) policies carried by most com-
panies. CGL policies have historically been identical to or based on pol-
icy terms in form contracts drafted by the Insurance Services Office
(ISO).' However, the lack of uniformity in court decisions interpreting
* Associate, Baker & Botts, Austin, Texas; J.D. 1990, Baylor University School of
Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § § 9601-75 (1988).
2. In general, CERCLA imposes liability, for the releases or threatened releases of
"hazardous substances" from a facility, on present owners and operators of the facility
and those at the time of disposal, as well as persons who arranged for the transport or
disposal of any hazardous substances at the site, and persons who transported any such
substances to the facility. The Superfund Act provides a wide range of liabilities for
responsible parties, including any removal or remedial costs incurred by the government
or private parties, any damages to natural resources and any costs associated with injunc-
tive relief ordered by the government. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). Although the majority
of the insurance coverage cases for environmental liabilities center around indemnifica-
tion for Superfund cleanups, parties also seek coverage for costs incurred under other
statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ § 6901-92 (1988), the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7642
(1988), amended 1990, and the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1387
(1988).
3. In a February 5, 1991 report, the Congressional General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded that insurance companies will continue to face substantial claim pay-
ments in the future for hazardous waste cleanups. The report is a follow-up to GAO
testimony at the September 27, 1990 hearing before the Policy Research and Insurance
Subcommittee of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee. Although
the GAO report is based on rather scant data (i.e., only nine insurance companies re-
sponded to the survey), GAO estimates a $26 billion to $200 billion potential loss for the
property and casualty insurance industry due to claims based on environmental damage.
4. The ISO basically functions as an advisory organization and statistical agent for
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whether liability for pollution is covered under CGL policy has troubled
both insurers and those insured.
The federal courts have not been able to effectuate a uniform approach
under CERCLA because the determinative issues are governed by the
law of the state with the most significant relationship to the negotiation
of the insurance contract terms. Using the law of the relevant state to
interpret contractual agreements has enabled courts to interpret nearly
identical language to reach polar outcomes. The courts, by applying dif-
ferent rules of interpretation and giving varying degrees of priority to
different policy considerations, arrive at opposite conclusions about
whether pollution coverage exists under a CGL policy. This paper dis-
cusses the various terms that are typically in dispute, the rules of inter-
pretation and policy considerations cited by various courts when
determining this issue, and suggested methods for interpreting and ana-
lyzing the question of coverage for environmental liabilities.'
I. TROUBLING TERMS IN THE CGL
The terms in the typical CGL policy that courts usually must address
in deciding whether pollution coverage is available are "occurrence,"
"damages," "property damage," and "sudden and accidental." The first
three terms are usually contained in the section of the CGL policy which
sets out the scope of insurance coverage. For example, the text of the
coverage provision in a standard CGL policy states that the insurer, "will
pay those sums that the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
'damages' because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this
insurance applies caused by an 'occurrence.' "6
As an initial matter in construing a CGL policy, a court must deter-
mine whether the environmental liabilities were caused by an occurrence.
Another critical inquiry in the environmental context is whether liabili-
ties, such as injunctions and response costs under CERCLA, are covered
damages caused by property damage. The standard CGL policy usually
will not specifically define the term "damages." However, property dam-
age is typically defined as "physical injury to tangible property, including
all resulting loss of use of that property." 7
The "sudden and accidental" language is typically found in the pollu-
tion exclusion clause, a provision included only in the more recent CGL
policies. The pollution exclusion clause normally is found in the section
the insurance industry. It was initially founded to provide policy forms and statistical
and actuarial information to its members, which consist of property and casualty liability
insurance companies. .
5. The opinions and conclusions set forth in this paper are the personal views of the
author. None of the matters set forth herein are represented to be the views of the au-
thor's past, present or future clients or colleagues.
6. Commercial General Liability Coverage Form at 1 (Insurance Services Office,
Inc., 1984).
7. Id. at 9.
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of the policy that enumerates those instances in which the CGL policy
will not provide indemnity. A standard pollution exclusion clause states
that coverage:
does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
acids, alkaloids, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the at-
mosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental. (emphasis added)8
Therefore, the exclusion clause will bar coverage for damages from pollu-
tion releases unless the discharge or damages are both sudden and
accidental.
II. HAS THERE BEEN AN "OCCURRENCE"?
The standard CGL policy, which is a third party liability policy, pro-
tects the insured from claims arising from damages to property belonging
to someone other than the insured which are caused by an "occurrence."
Before 1966, coverage under a CGL policy was triggered by an "acci-
dent," which was undefined in the policy. This fact usually led to litiga-
tion over whether an "accident" involved an event that occurred
suddenly,9 or whether it also included events occurring over a longer
period of time.' I After 1966, the term "occurrence" replaced "accident"
in the standard CGL policy and was defined as: "an accident, including
continuous or repeated injurious exposure to conditions, which results,
during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.""
Although some courts have determined that there is no "occurrence"
in situations involving environmental damages, 2 insureds facing such li-
abilities do not usually encounter problems in proving the "accident"
8. Id. See also E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. J. 1237, 1251 (1986).
9. For an example, see City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206
N.W.2d 632, 637 (Neb. 1973).
10. See American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co., 270 F.2d 686,
690 (8th Cir. 1959).
11. The development of the concept of an "occurrence" in the CGL policy was a
compromise between the conflicting positions of insurance companies and those insured.
Under the pre-1966 "accident" policy, those insured argued and many courts accepted
the idea that coverage should exist for injuries that were unexpected or unintended from
the viewpoint of the insured, even if such injuries occurred over long periods of time.
Conversely, insurers argued that an "accident" must be an identifiable event which oc-
curs in a relatively brief period of time. To accommodate both of these theories, the
insurance industry developed the "occurrence" policy.
12. For example, in Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir.
1986) (applying Maryland law), the Fourth Circuit held that there was no "occurrence"
during the policy period. However, the case involved somewhat unique factual circum-
stances since the policy was only in effect during 1969, and the insured's complaint did
not indicate any damage to the government plaintiffs before 1981 or any release discovery
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portion of the "occurrence" definition if the factual circumstances sup-
port such a conclusion. However, there has been a great deal of contro-
versy over the language within the "occurrence" definition of "neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." In interpret-
ing this clause and the existence of an occurrence in general, the follow-
ing major issues must be addressed by the court: (1) is it the resulting
environmental damages or the actual event which must not be expected
nor intended by the insured?; (2) if the answer to the above question is
the resulting damages, what test should the court apply to determine
whether an insured "expected or intended" such damages or injuries?;
and (3) what are the relevant factors in determining the timing of an
occurrence?
A. Expected or Intended Discharge or Injuries?
The question of whether an occurrence is expected or intended de-
pends upon the particular factual circumstances of the case. Insurers
have generally argued that there should be no coverage as a matter of law
when the insured discharges waste as a part of its routine business (i.e.,
the discharge is known, routine and repeated). Therefore, insurance
companies argue that it is the discharge which must be neither expected
nor intended by the insured for there to be coverage. On the other hand,
insureds argue that it is the resulting damage or injuries which they must
neither expect nor intend. According to the insureds, an occurrence
should be covered as long as the insured does not know as a practical
certainty that damage will occur from a discharge.
Generally, most courts have accepted the insureds' theory in holding
that the relevant factor in determining the existence of an occurrence is
whether the damage was intended or expected. 1 3 In taking this position,
some courts have held that unexpected or unintended damages resulting
from even intentional conduct on the part of the insured are covered
under the typical CGL policy.14 Other courts have taken a contrary po-
sition by focusing on whether the action (i.e., discharge) of the insured
was expected or intended, rather than concentrating on the harm itself. 5
prior to 1981. See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 752 F. Supp. 812
(E.D. Mich. 1990).
13. See, e.g., City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150
(2d Cir. 1989) (New York); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d
1293, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1982) (Louisiana); City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1979) (Iowa); American Universal Ins. Co. v. White-
wood Custom Treaters, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (D.S.D. 1989); International Min-
erals and Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 765 (Ill. App. 1988).
14. See James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814
S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (injuries are covered even though the activity which pro-
duced the alleged result is fully intended and the residual effects fully known, as long as
the damage itself is completely unexpected and unintended); International Minerals, 522
N.E.2d at 765; Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
451 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
15. See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d
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In most cases, the insured will prevail on this issue, even if the insured
engaged in intentional discharges of contaminants that were in compli-
ance with any applicable regulations and the best management practices
at the time of the discharge, provided that the damages were neither ex-
pected nor intended. Damages resulting from intentional discharges
which are not in compliance with applicable regulations will most likely
not be covered since they will probably be seen as expected or intended.
B. Interpretation of "Expected" or "Intended"
The next inquiry is the meaning of the requirement in the CGL policy
that the event or damage must be "expected or intended" from the in-
sureds' viewpoint. Some key issues often raised in this area are the state
of mind of the insured and the degree of foreseeability necessary to im-
plement the "expected or intended" clause. A minority position among
the courts, advocated by insureds, involves a subjective test of whether
the insured actually intended the damages or should have expected the
resulting damage with a substantial certainty.16 However, several courts
have applied an objective test, holding that the event/harm is expected or
intended if the result is "reasonably foreseeable." 7 Other courts have
held that there is no occurrence if the insured knew, or should have
known that there was a substantial probability that the resulting damages
would follow.18 Although this middle of the road approach seems to be
the most common among courts, other tribunals hold that any damages
resulting from regularly conducted business activities are expected or in-
tended by the insured and therefore are not covered.' 9
C. Timing and Triggering of Coverage
Once an insured adequately proves the existence of an occurrence, the
court must apply state law to determine the actual time of the occurrence
under the policy. This determination is extremely important for the pur-
pose of determining whether the occurrence happened during the policy
30, 33 (1st Cir. 1984) (New Hampshire) (pollution occurring as part of regular business
activity considered to be expected or intended property damage); Ashland Oil, Inc., 678
F.2d at 1317-18 (applying Louisiana law); Detrex Chem. Indus., v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 457 (N.D. Ohio 1987); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553-54 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (no coverage when insured
engages in intentional and continuous dumping).
16. See, e.g., City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150
(2d Cir. 1989) (New York); Honeycomb Sys., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp.
1400, 1407 (D. Me. 1983).
17. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 548, 552 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Illinois) (coverage denied if insured reasonably anticipated results); City of
Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 905, 906 (10th Cir. 1964) (Colorado).
18. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1981) (Minne-
sota); City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir.
1979) (Iowa); Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1978); see New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321, 1330-31 (D. Del. 1988).
19. See, e.g., Great Lakes, 727 F.2d at 34.
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period. Most courts 'hold that the time of an occurrence is when "bodily
injury" or "property damage" takes place,20 as opposed to when the in-
sured committed the negligent or wrongful act.2 ' However, a critical and
difficult issue involves when such damage or injury actually occurs.
Due to the unique nature of environmental contamination, the actual
date of an occurrence may be difficult to determine because discharges of
hazardous waste often occur gradually and the manifestation of the in-
jury may be delayed. However, courts have developed various theories
to pinpoint the date of an occurrence, including the following: (1) mani-
festation or discovery; (2) exposure; (3) wrongful act; (4) injury-in-fact;
and (5) continuous trigger. Although the court decisions follow no con-
sistent pattern, the manifestation or discovery theory is perhaps the most
widely accepted. Under that theory, an occurrence takes place on the
date the injury is or should have been discovered.22 When applying the
exposure and wrongful act theories, coverage is triggered on the date of
the commencement of the damage. In cases of property damage from
releases of hazardous waste under the exposure and wrongful act theo-
ries, the occurrence is on the date of the release.23 Under the injury-in-
fact method, coverage begins on the date an actual injury exists, regard-
less of the time of exposure or manifestation.24
Finally, an approach typically advocated by insureds is the continuous
or multiple trigger theory. This method, which is a hybrid of the "mani-
festation" and "exposure" approaches, states that the occurrence may
happen anytime in the continuous period from the date of exposure to
the date of manifestation. 25 Therefore, the multiple trigger approach
provides a very broad time frame for the date of an occurrence, since any
insurance policy in effect at the time of the period of exposure or manifes-
tation will cover the damage. In complex cases where damages have oc-
curred over a long period of time, many courts have chosen the multiple
trigger approach to maximize coverage on the basis of a fact-specific
20. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 1325, 1327 (4th Cir.
1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 195 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
21. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983) (asbestos); Acushnet River v. New Bedford
Harbor, 725 F. Supp. 1264, 1274-75 (D. Mass. 1989).
22. See Eagle-Picher Indus., 682 F.2d at 25; American Home Assurance Co. v. Libby-
Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1986).
23. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1989) (Missouri); Acushnet River, 725 F. Supp. at 1274; De-
trex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 456 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
24. See Triangle Publications v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp.
1334, 1358 (D.D.C. 1986).
25. See New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D.
Del. 1989); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653
F. Supp. 152, 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443, 446
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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inquiry.26
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AS "DAMAGES"
Once a court has determined there has been a covered "occurrence"
within the time period of the policy, the court must construe the damages
provision of the policy. In the typical case construing insurance coverage
for liabilities relating to environmental contamination, a court must de-
termine whether "property damage" has occurred and whether response
costs or other measures associated with the cleanup of releases of waste
are "damages" within the context of the CGL policy.
A. "Property Damage" in the Insurance Contract
One of the earliest federal appellate court cases denying coverage for
Superfund response costs involved the interpretation of the definition of
property damage. In Mraz v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co., 27 the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Maryland had
investigated and paid for the cleanup of 1300 barrels of chemical waste in
a clay-lined pit known as the Leslie Superfund Site. Those two entities
later filed suit against Mraz who had disposed of toxic waste at the site to
recover their cleanup costs. Mraz brought an action for declaratory
judgment against Canadian Universal Insurance to establish the com-
pany's duty to defend and indemnify him against the EPA suit.
Applying Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
for Canadian Universal on several grounds, one of which was its inter-
pretation of property damage.2" The court interpreted CERCLA to im-
pose liability on responsible parties for all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the federal or state government, for other costs of
response incurred by any other people, and for damages for injury to
natural resources at a Superfund site.29 However, the definition of natu-
ral resources is limited to resources owned, managed or held in trust by
the United States or another governmental unit.3" Thus, even though
damage to the property may have occurred at the Leslie Site, the literal
terms of the statute provided that this was not damage to the natural
resources (i.e., the property) because the U.S. government had not
claimed interest in the property. Therefore, the court found that the re-
sponse costs under these circumstances were economic losses rather than
covered property damages. As the policy provided coverage for property
damage and bodily injury only, Canadian Universal was not required to
26. See, e.g., Michigan Chems. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d
374, 383 (6th Cir. 1984); Scientific Control Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., CA No. 87-4438
(D.N.J. 1990); New Castle, 725 F. Supp. at 812-13; Gottlieb, 570 A.2d at 446-47.
27. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 1329.
29. Id. at 1328-29.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1988).
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indemnify Mraz for the response costs.31
Many commentators feel that the Mraz decision does not properly in-
terpret the coverage provisions in the CGL policy. Under the terms of
the usual CGL policy, the insurer does not promise to pay for property
damage, but rather for amounts that the insured is obligated to pay as
damages because of property damage. Although there was no dispute in
Mraz that damages in the form of response costs had occurred at the
Leslie Site, the court stated that the policy obligated Canadian Universal
to pay only for the actual property damage.3 2 Most courts do not follow
this distinction. Rather, in interpreting coverage for response costs, most
tribunals focus not on whether cleanup costs are "property damage," but
on whether cleanup costs are "damages" within the scope of the insur-
ance contract.
B. Interpreting the Term "Damages"
Perhaps the most widely disputed issue in coverage cases is whether
response costs under CERCLA and related environmental statutes con-
stitute damages under the terms of CGL policies. However, the judicial
need to define "damages" is not a new problem created by CERCLA
liability. Before the passage of CERCLA in 1980, this issue was often
addressed under state laws regulating environmental cleanup.
For example, in Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protec-
tion,33 a case involving the discharge of oil into a river, the Superior
Court of New Jersey rejected the arguments that property damage meant
only measurable damage to physical property, and that response costs for
environmental cleanups were not legally imposed obligations on an in-
sured.34 In examining a statute that measured damages by the cost of
eliminating the harmful substances, the Lansco court determined that the
damages involved consist of the costs of cleanup, because this was the
amount that Lansco was legally obligated to pay." Other courts have
taken a contrary position, denying coverage for costs incurred under pre-
Superfund remedies such as court orders, that required parties to take
some action to remove environmental conditions. Such actions consti-
tute equitable relief and therefore are not damages.36
31. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328-29.
32. Id.
33. 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975).
34. Id. at 524.
35. Id. at 525 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. 58:10-23.7, repealed by L. 1976, c. 141,
§ 28).
36. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955)
(Florida); Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 106 A.2d 196, 199 (N.H. 1954) (costs
of complying with court-injunction to remove obstruction on land causing adjacent prop-
erty to flood was not "damages" because it constituted equitable relief). But see Doyle v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 136 N.E.2d 484, 486-87 (N.Y. 1956) (damages could have been
awarded had the plaintiffs established their right to equitable relief).
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1. CERCLA Cleanup Costs Equal "Damages"
State and federal courts applying state law are split over whether
Superfund cleanup costs are damages under the terms of a CGL policy.
Of the few state supreme courts that have addressed the issue,37 the ma-
jority of those courts, such as North Carolina, Washington, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, and California, have ruled that CERCLA response
costs are covered "damages" under the terms of a CGL policy. In a
November 1990 decision in AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara County,38 the California Supreme Court continued a majority
trend among the state supreme courts in holding that environmental
cleanup costs incurred as a result of CERCLA and similar state statutes
are "damages because of property damage" under CGL policies.39
In AIU, the California court held in favor of the insured for three main
reasons. First, the court rejected the equitable/legal distinction for CER-
CLA remedies adopted by many courts that had held that damages in-
cluded only "legal" damages. In interpreting "legally obligated to pay,"
the court held that as a matter of plain meaning, the above term involved
injunctive relief and recovery of response costs under CERCLA. ° Sec-
ond, the court found that CERCLA cleanup costs fell within the plain,
dictionary meaning of damages which included "compensation, in
money, recovered by a party for 'loss' or 'detriment' it ha[d] suffered
through the acts of another."41 Under this definition, the court included
the reimbursement of response costs incurred by the government because
a release of hazardous waste causes "detriment" to government interests
(i.e., out-of-pocket losses) and reimbursement of such costs is compensa-
tion in money.42 Additionally, the court rejected the insurer's argument
that CERCLA distinguished between response costs and damages, find-
ing that the intent of the parties, which should be the primary focus,
"could not possibly have been influenced by the niceties of statutory lan-
guage adopted many years after the policies were drafted."43 Finally, the
court continued a nearly unanimous position of courts nationwide in
holding that cleanup costs were incurred "because of property
damage.""
37. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990); Lido Co. of New England v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 574 A.2d 299 (Me. 1990);
C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft and Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557 (N.C.
1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990) (en bane);
Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990).
38. 799 P.2d at 1276.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1266.
41. Id. at 1267.
42. AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1269-70.
43. Id. at 1266-67.
44. Id. at 1279. See also Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2d
Cir. 1989) (New York), reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2588
(1990); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. Ct.
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As further rationale for holding that CERCLA response costs are
damages within a CGL policy, the AIU court noted that ambiguities
should be construed in favor of the insured. In finding for the insured,
the court rejected the insurer's argument that the policy holder, as a so-
phisticated purchaser of insurance with substantial bargaining power,
should not benefit from settled rules of contract interpretation. Instead,
the court found that the sole relevant inquiry involved the reasonable
expectations of the insured, and that since the policies at issue were stan-
dard form CGL policies, any "negotiations" had no bearing on the inter-
pretation of the contract. Additionally, the court tended to favor a broad
interpretation of the environmental policy by holding that liabilities
under CERCLA, although not contemplated at the time of the formation
of many insurance contracts, were still covered damages. The court held
this because new forms of liability that were court-made or legislative in
nature were possible risks which the insured would have reasonably ex-
pected to be covered under the relevant policy.45
The AIU decision discusses many of the issues and conclusions typi-
cally contained in decisions holding that response costs are damages
under a CGL policy. Consistent with this theory, many other courts
have held that CERCLA cleanup costs are within the ambit of damages
under the typical CGL policy. In perhaps the leading federal case reach-
ing this result, Avondale Industries v. Traveler's Indemnity Co. ,46 the Sec-
ond Circuit interpreted the CGL policy as an ordinary businessperson
would. According to the A vondale court, under New York law, a reason-
able insured policyholder should not be expected to be aware of and un-
derstand the legal/equitable distinction on which some courts rely to find
that CERCLA costs are equitable remedies and therefore not damages.4 7
Those courts that include response costs within the definition of dam-
ages and ignore the legal/equitable distinction often cite the early
Superfund case of United States Aviex v. Travelers Insurance Co.4s Aviex
involved an action in which the State of Michigan sought an injunction
to remedy groundwater contamination. The insurance companies argued
that the phrase "shall become obligated to pay by reason of liability im-
App. 1983); Ryan, Klimek, Ryan Partnership v. Royal Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 862 (D.R.I.
1990); National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765,
767 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F.
Supp. 1403, 1407-08 (E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 896 F.2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1990); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342,
350 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp.
394, 398-400 (D.N.J. 1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152,
193-94 (W.D. Mo. 1986). Cf National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty
Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
45. AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1264-66.
46. 887 F.2d 1200.
47. Id. at 1207; see also New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.,
933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1990) (common, everyday meaning of the word "damages" en-
compasses liabilities arising from both actions at law and at equity).
48. 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. App. 1983).
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posed by law" referred only to legal claims such as monetary damages
for injury to or destruction of property. Rejecting this interpretation as
too narrow, the court found that if the state had sued in court for tradi-
tional damages of cleanup costs, the insurance company would have been
obligated to pay.49 In holding that the action was covered damages, the
Michigan Court of Appeals further stated that it was "merely fortuitous"
that the state chose an equitable injunction to order the plaintiff to rem-
edy the problem. In Aviex, damages were measured by the costs to re-
store the water to its original state.5° This analysis and measure of
damages has been followed by several federal district courts in Superfund
related actions for response costs.5
2. Response Costs Are Not Damages
Interestingly, the majority of the federal appellate courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have generally ruled that damages only flow from legal
actions and that insurance policies do not provide indemnity for equita-
ble relief, injunctions or restitution. For example, the Fourth Circuit in
Mraz was more concerned with the government's interest in the recovery
of property damage than whether response costs are damages within the
meaning of the insurance policy.52 The Fourth Circuit also addressed
the classification of response costs in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco,
Inc. 53 There, it held that according to Maryland law, a claim seeking
compliance with federal directives in the form of injunctions or restitu-
tion of cleanup costs is not a claim for damages within the meaning of the
insurance policy. While noting that insurance contracts are ordinarily
construed to favor the layman or insured, the Armco court stated that the
term "damages" should be construed by its "narrow, technical defini-
tion."54 Although the policy in Armco promised to indemnify the in-
sured for all sums they become "obligated to pay as damages," the court
noted that interpreting damages as any sum which the insured is obli-
gated to pay would violate the rule of interpretation which states that
courts must always attempt to give meaning to each word of a contract. 5
The court reached this conclusion by attacking the logic of the Michi-
gan court in A viex. First, the Fourth Circuit did not agree with the A viex
49. Id. at 843.
50. See id. at 842-43.
51. See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990) (an-
swering certified question from U.S. District Court); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna
Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (limits maximum amount of
response costs recoverable to the total value of the damaged property); Chesapeake Utils.
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 558-61 (D. Del. 1989);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 193-97 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
52. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1326, 1326 (4th Cir. 1986).
53. 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (4th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 1352.
55. See id. at 1352-53. But see Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., No. 87-
CG-4860 (Baltimore Cty. Cir. Ct. filed March 19, 1991) (standard CGL policy provides
coverage for the cost of cleaning up environmental contamination).
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court that the costs of damages would be equal to the costs of restoring
the property. The Fourth Circuit believed that property damage claims
should be capped at the value of the property, while cleanup costs could
well exceed the value of the property because such costs often go beyond
restorative efforts and become preventative safety measures. 6 Insurance
contracts, the court reasoned, are meant to indemnify for the quantifiable
loss to tangible property and not for any safety measures the government
deems necessary. 7
A similar conclusion was reached by the Eighth Circuit in Continental
Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO). 5s The NEPACCO court, applying Missouri law, stated
that the word "damages" is unambiguous in its insurance context and
refers only to legal damages. 59 The basis for the court's conclusion was
primarily the fact that the Superfund legislation differentiates between
cleanup costs and damages to resources.' The court reasoned that this
variance indicates that the term damages has a separate meaning in the
environmental response context.61 As an example that some courts still
apply this reasoning, the Maine Supreme Court recently relied on
NEPACCO and Armco in ruling that an insurance company cannot be
liable for remedial costs incurred by their insured for a state-ordered
cleanup.62
IV. THE MEANING OF "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL"
Most CGL policies issued after 1970 include a further attempt to limit
coverage for environmental losses through use of the pollution exclusion
clause. This eliminates coverage for bodily injury or property damage
resulting from a wide range of pollution releases. However, most pollu-
tion exclusion clauses provide that the exception does not apply if the
discharge is "sudden and accidental." As more insureds have sought
56. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armoline, 822 F.2d 1348, 1353; Federal Ins. v.
Susquehanna Broadcasting, 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (limiting the amount
recoverable as "damages" to the pre-loss value of the contaminated property). Since all
remedial costs are still recoverable, this could lead to logically inconsistent situations
where indivisible items of response costs are arbitrarily split into categories of "damages"
and "economic losses." See id.
57. Id. at 169.
58. 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); see also Grisham v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 89-1481 (8th Cir. filed March 8, 1991) (applying Arkan-
sas law). In Grisham, the plaintiff had used a 20-acre site to treat fenceposts and other
lumber products between 1984 and 1985, pumping waste water from the wood treatment
procedure into the ground and spreading it around the plant area for weed and dust
control. The court reaffirmed its ruling in the NEPACCO case, holding that cleanup
costs do not constitute damages within the meaning of the insurance policies. Id.
59. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
61. NEPACCO, 842 F.2d at 986.
62. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Me. 1990).
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coverage for liability stemming from gradual leakage or regular dis-
charges, the meaning of this phrase has been widely litigated.
Judges and attorneys urge interpretation of these terms on two basic
lines. Those favoring the insured argue that the word "sudden" is am-
biguous, and must be interpreted to favor the insured. They argue that
"sudden" should be defined as "unexpected," which would provide cov-
erage for any release which the insured did not intend, know of or have
reason to expect. Those representing insurance companies argue that the
word "sudden" has a temporal meaning from which it cannot be di-
vorced. Under this theory, gradual, continuing leaks cannot be squared
with the temporal conception of the word "sudden."
A. Pro-Insured Theories
Early judicial interpretations of this issue tended to construe the exclu-
sion in favor of the insured by interpreting the "sudden and accidental"
clause to be a restatement of the term "occurrence." Under the rationale
of these cases, if the discharge or damages were neither expected nor
intended by the insured, the pollution exclusion clause will not bar cover-
age. For example, in 1975, the Lansco court faced a situation that it
found to be "sudden and accidental" under this theory when vandals
opened the valves on some of Lansco's retention tanks, causing oil to leak
into a nearby river.63 This contamination was "sudden" in that it oc-
curred both quickly and unexpectedly. Further, it was clear that there
had been no intent on the part of Lansco to pollute the river." Accord-
ing to the New Jersey court, the definition of "sudden" included happen-
ing without previous notice or on very brief notice, unforeseen,
unexpected, or unprepared. "Accidental" was defined as happening un-
expectedly, by chance or taking place not according to a usual course.
Despite the temporal component in the above definition of "sudden," the
court concluded that since the oil spill was unexpected and unintended
from the viewpoint of the insured, the "sudden and accidental" provision
was triggered.65
Many modern courts have also construed the "sudden and accidental"
clause in favor of the insured. For example, in New Castle County v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,66 the disposal of solid waste in a
63. Lansco, 350 A.2d 521, 524.
64. Id. at 524.
65. Id. Some courts have held that the "sudden and accidental" language applies to
the results of the discharge rather than the release itself. See Jackson Township Mun.
Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1982). Although derived from case law in other states, this conclusion seems to
contradict the clear language of the pollution exclusion clause. It is difficult to reach the
conclusion that "sudden and accidental" applies to the results and not the release itself
since the language of the pollution exclusion clause states that the exclusion does not
apply "if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental."
66. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., Nos. 89-3814, 90-3012,
90-3030 (3rd Cir. 1991), 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987).
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county-operated landfill from 1969 until 1971 resulted in contamination
of the local drinking water supply. In applying Delaware law, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the phrase "sudden and accidental"
was ambiguous and therefore interpreted the term in favor of the insured
to mean "unexpected and unintended., 67 Other recent federal and state
courts have also followed this trend.6 8 However, several recent court de-
cisions, while interpreting sudden and accidental to mean unexpected or
unintended, have denied coverage where the parties have intentionally
disposed of hazardous waste as a regular course of business.69 Under
such circumstances, these courts have held that the damages are not un-
expected or unintended from the viewpoint of the insured.
Although parties still occasionally assert that the term "sudden" re-
lates to the results of the discharge,70 more recent decisions simply inter-
pret the ambiguity of "sudden" as it relates to the release of pollutants.
An example of this occurred in Claussen v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. ,71 where, between 1971 and 1985, land surrounding the Picketville
Superfund Site was contaminated by seepage from a landfill. In constru-
ing the pollution exclusion clause within the policy, the Georgia South-
ern District Court ruled that the language was unambiguous and
coverage did not provide for gradual pollution. On certification from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court replied
that "sudden" has a variety of meanings ranging from "unexpected" to
"abrupt." Noting that Georgia courts require ambiguities in insurance
contracts to be construed in a light favorable to the insured, the court
held that "sudden and accidental" must be interpreted to exclude a tem-
poral element.72
Some courts have used the drafting history behind the pollution exclu-
sion clause in a typical CGL policy to find in favor of the insured. For
example, under the so-called "modem view" of contract interpretation
under Delaware law, the Delaware courts have held that extrinsic evi-
dence in the form of the drafting history of the language in a CGL policy
67. Id.; see also Hybrid Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., C.A. No. 14597, 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 362 (Ohio Ct. App. January 30, 1991).
68. See Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
69. See Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., 938 F.2d 1423, 1427-28
(1st Cir. 1991) (coverage denied where party continually discharged PCBs into nearby
river as a regular course of business for a lengthy period of time); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 765 F. Supp. 677 (D. Utah 1991)
(damages not "sudden and accidental" where the dumping of PCBs into dirt pits for 15
years was a continuous and deliberate business practice).
70. See supra note 65.
71. 888 F.2d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 748; see also New York v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 547 N.Y.S.2d 452
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Time Oil Co. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 743 F.
Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D. Wash. 1990). The Claussen court specifically rejected the rea-
soning of Jackson Township, 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) however, by
commenting that there is a clear distinction between focusing on results and focusing on
discharges.
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is admissible to determine the meaning of terms within such policies.7 3 A
court is likely to review such drafting history if it finds that the terms
within the CGL policy are ambiguous, despite the fact that CGL policies
typically consist of standard insurance forms which are not the result of
negotiations between the insurer and the insured. The drafting history
behind the pollution exclusion clause suggests that when the clause was
added in 1970, it was not intended to protect against coverage for pollu-
tion which did not occur suddenly in a temporal sense. Rather, the addi-
tion of the clause was intended to further preclude coverage for
intentional pollution.74 Therefore, insureds often advocate use of the
drafting history behind the pollution exclusion clause to reach a conclu-
sion that "sudden and accidental" is equivalent to unexpected or unin-
tended from the viewpoint of the insured.
B. Decisions Favoring Insurers
A substantial number of courts have taken contrary positions, finding
that a particular release does not fit under the "sudden and accidental"
clause. One of the earliest of these cases, City of Milwaukee v. Allied
Smelting Corp.,7 involved acidic discharges into a city sewage system
over a period of three years. In Allied Smelting, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals agreed that any ambiguities must be construed against the insur-
ance company, but noted that three additional rules of interpretation ap-
ply. First, the objective of any construction must be to determine and
carry out the intentions of the parties. Second, to determine the parties'
intent, a practical construction is most persuasive. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, no insurance contract should be rewritten in a way
that would bind an insurer to a risk that was not contemplated and for
which a premium was not paid. 76 The court then examined the meaning
of the phrase "sudden and accidental" and held that since coverage is
generally limited to injuries stemming from a "sudden and identifiable
event with respect to both location and time,"717 long-term damage and
gradual pollution would not be covered.78
Other courts have suggested additional interpretations when finding in
favor of insurance companies. For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insur-
ance Co.79 held that gradual pollution is excluded under the CGL policy,
because when read in context of the entire exclusion, the "sudden and
73. Cf. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89C-AU-99, 1991
Del. Super. LEXIS 416 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1991).
74. Donald V. Jernberg, Note, The Role of Drafting History In Environmental Cover-
age Litigation, 4-3 Toxics L. REP. 78, 81 (1989).
75. 344 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
76. Id. at 525-26.
77. Id. at 527.
78. Id.
79. 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
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accidental" clause "describes the event-not only in terms of its being
unexpected, but in terms of its happening instantaneously or precipi-
tantly."" ° In addition, the Waste Management court was concerned that
allowing coverage merely for unexpected pollution would encourage in-
sureds to be ignorant about potential releases and the results of the pollu-
tion."1 Given the enormous potential liability in pollution claims, the
court felt that financial responsibility should be placed on the insured,
the party best able to prevent the initial contamination. 2
Recently, a number of courts have followed this temporal interpreta-
tion of the "sudden and accidental" clause by rejecting coverage for
gradual pollution claims on the basis that "sudden and accidental" sim-
ply cannot be read in context without a time element.83 In FL Aerospace
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. ,84 a recent case decided under Michigan
law, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed this line of reasoning.
In Aerospace, the Sixth Circuit refused to hold that pollution which oc-
curred over a thirteen year period was within the "sudden and acciden-
tal" exception to the pollution exclusion clause. In finding the words
unambiguous, the court stated, " 'sudden' has a plain, everyday temporal
component" and must be interpreted in that light.85
In some instances, additional questions surround the pollution exclu-
sion clause. For example, the decision of a court may turn on the mean-
ing of the term "accidental." Although the intentional dumping of
pollutants into a site will usually not be covered, 86 the outcome is not so
clear if waste is intentionally disposed in a site but then migrates to an-
other site causing the pollution at issue. In this situation, there will be an
"occurrence" to trigger coverage if the pollution is unintended and unex-
pected and, in some courts, the gradual leakage can be considered "sud-
den." However, courts have almost uniformly refused to override the
pollution exclusion clause when the discharges have been part of the reg-
80. Id. at 382; see also Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1991) (under New York law, a sudden discharge must occur over a short period of time);
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(discharges of PCBs into adjacent waterway over an 11 year period are not "sudden and
accidental").
81. Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 381 (policy argument for keeping insured
vigilant).
82. Id.
83. See Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 731 F. Supp.
1517 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (pollution was clearly cumulative and cannot be classified as ab-
rupt or sudden); C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F.
Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989) (It "offends common sense" to describe a gradual leak as
sudden. The opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme Court use "gradual" and "sudden"
as opposites.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-o Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (to read "sudden" as meaning only "unexpected" is to render the definition
of "accidental" mere surplusage).
84. 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 219.
86. See, e.g., Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d
1048 (N.Y. 1989).
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ular course and operations of the insured's regular business activity.87
V. SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING COVERAGE
The discussion of the issues above illustrates the difficulties involved in
interpreting insurance contracts in the context of response cost claims
under CERCLA. The primary problem in this area is that state and
federal courts apply the law of the state with the most significant interest.
Under this approach, coverage under a CGL policy for environmentally
related costs has become a question of contract interpretation under state
law, which has led to a wide range of divergent opinions.
However, this issue should not be divorced from the primary policy
considerations of CERCLA. Congress promulgated the Superfund Act
in 1980 to establish a broad, comprehensive scheme under which respon-
sible parties would be jointly and severally liable for environmental dam-
ages covered by the statute. In the decade since CERCLA's enactment,
this expanded liability for environmental damages has embroiled unsus-
pecting business and land owners in investigative and cleanup claims re-
garding the effects of substances that they never foresaw. In certain
instances, parties should be held responsible for their actions, including
when they intentionally discharge or dispose of hazardous substances.
However, persons who had engaged in operations which were legally ap-
propriate at one time and were not considered harmful to the environ-
ment under applicable laws, are now also liable for an expanded scope of
releases of allegedly harmful materials. When interpreting insurance
contracts in such instances, the courts should consider the policies be-
hind CERCLA, as well as the general purposes of insurance within
American business.
The courts should seek to strike a balance between the competing con-
cerns of the insurance industry, and the public policy goals of federal and
state Superfund laws (meant to ensure that adequate monies are available
to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites). In doing so, courts
should interpret the terms of CGL policies according to the factual cir-
cumstances of each case, keeping in mind that the purpose of insurance is
to protect insureds from unexpected and often unpreventable liabilities.
Despite the fact that neither insureds nor insurers are able to foresee the
types of liability created under CERCLA, the CGL policy, by its broad
terms, should require insurance companies to assume the liabilities im-
posed by the Superfund Act, unless applicable contractual terms specifi-
cally negate such liabilities.
A. An Objective View of "Occurrence"
In light of the discussion above, the meaning of the term "occurrence,"
should be the starting point for interpreting the terms of a CGL policy.
87. See Industrial Indem. at 1520-21; Great Lakes Container v. National Union Fire
Ins., 727 F.2d 30 (Ist Cir. 1984) (New Hampshire).
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Under a CGL policy, a court should find an "occurrence" when the
damage resulting from the involved conduct is neither "expected" nor
"intended" by the insured. In many situations, parties have found them-
selves liable for actions that, while totally legitimate under applicable
laws at the time, now result in unprecedented liability under CERCLA.
It would be unfair to hold such parties liable for actions or courses of
conduct which, while intentional, were legitimate under applicable laws.
Further, to reach an equitable result, the meaning of "expected or in-
tended" should focus on whether the harm is "reasonably foreseeable"
from the standpoint of the insured. Additionally, courts should utilize
the continuous or multiple trigger approach to determine whether an
"occurrence" has taken place during the policy period. This approach
best suits the factual situations in most environmental cases, which in-
volve damages resulting from gradual releases occurring over long time
periods. Under the continuous trigger approach, an insured may assert
claims for damages due to the release(s) which should, in reality, be
treated as a single, continuous event. Applying these standards would
provide a fair and adequate basis to determine whether an insurance
company should be responsible for damages caused by the conduct
(either intentional or unintentional) of the insured.
B. CERCLA Response Costs - Should They Be Covered?
A more important issue involves interpreting whether response costs
incurred under CERCLA are "damages" within the scope of the CGL
policy. The artificial distinction between a complaint seeking injunctive
relief and a claim explicitly asserting legal "damages" should be elimi-
nated. Those courts that adopt a narrow, technical definition of "dam-
ages" under state contract law apply unsubstantiated reasoning which
ignores the cleanup policies underlying CERCLA. First, damages to the
environment constitute "property damage" under the terms of a typical
CGL policy, regardless of whether such a decision focuses on the "detri-
ment" to governmental or private interests (i.e., out-of-pocket losses) or
on the actual damage to land, trees, air, or water. Second, the potential
classification of CERCLA response costs as damages under a CGL pol-
icy is an ambiguity that should be construed in favor of the insured.88
Injunctive relief and response costs under CERCLA fall within the scope
of the CGL policy's definition of damages as amounts which the insured
is "legally obligated to pay." Likewise, these costs meet the common
dictionary meaning of damages, since the insured is paying, in effect,
compensation to the government for loss or detriment to governmental
interests (i.e., the environment) caused by the acts of the insured.
Another relevant inquiry in interpreting this issue is the reasonable
expectations of the parties. CGL policies are usually in standard form.
88. As held by the California Supreme Court in the AIU Insurance Co. case. AIU
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
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"Negotiations" between the parties generally should have no bearing on
the interpretation of the contract. However, the court should consider
the broad environmental policy of CERCLA and recognize that, while
CERCLA damages might not have been contemplated when an insur-
ance contract was formed, the insured would have reasonably expected
the possible risk of court-made or legislative liabilities to be covered
under the relevant policy. Additionally, a finding which covers such lia-
bilities serves the purpose of insurance policies because the court pro-
vides coverage to the insureds for unsuspected liabilities.
The outcome may vary in cases where the EPA claims causes of action
involving injunctive measures aimed solely at preventive relief. For ex-
ample, where a complaint seeks injunctive relief or where insureds have
entered into consent decrees regarding the investigation of a site, courts
should focus on whether actual hazardous waste contamination, includ-
ing the contamination of surface water and groundwater, has taken
place. If an injunction only requires the insured to take preventative
measures, a court should not find coverage under an applicable CGL
policy because there has been no "property damage." An example of
such a situation would involve a Superfund cleanup order based on the
potential threat of release of hazardous substances. Such a narrow inter-
pretation should be limited solely to a situation involving injunctive
claims where no property damage has yet occurred. However, where
property damage has occurred, courts should find that response costs are
covered for measures to clean up contamination and to prevent the fur-
ther spread of contamination. Under CERCLA, a sufficient site cleanup
means removing hazardous substances and taking measures to prevent
future releases of the involved substances. All of these "cleanup" costs
should be included as reasonable measures of "damages" under the terms
of the CGL policy.
VI. "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL" - MUST IT HAPPEN QUICKLY?
A similar balancing of interests should be conducted when a court in-
terprets the meaning of the terms "sudden and accidental" in the pollu-
tion exclusion clause of CGL policies. Although courts should attempt
to give effect to the broad policies of CERCLA, they must also interpret
the language of a specific contract in light of the intent of the parties to
the agreement. When parties enter into an insurance contract containing
a pollution exclusion clause, they agree to limit, to some extent, the scope
of coverage for liabilities caused by various types of "pollution." There-
fore, courts should give appropriate deference to this intention of the
parties.
However, the courts should also consider the insurer's intent behind
the addition of the pollution exclusion clause to the CGL policy. This
provision further protects insurers by eliminating the coverage for dam-
ages resulting from releases, which the insureds may have expected.
Courts which have construed "sudden and accidental" to mean "unex-
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pected" or "unintended" have appropriately interpreted the literal terms
of the typical CGL policy. For example, intentional discharges of haz-
ardous substances which have occurred as part of a continuous business
practice of a company for a lengthy time period (i.e., over five years)
should not be covered under a CGL policy. However, if the discharges
are neither intentional nor continuous, but rather are sporadic, separate
events occurring over a long period of time, the courts must closely ana-
lyze these factual circumstances to determine whether damages from spe-
cific events are covered. Such an approach will accommodate the broad
policy implications of CERCLA, as well as the intent of the parties in the
insurance agreement.
CONCLUSION
The above proposed approach would result in a fair and equitable in-
terpretation of insurance coverage of environmental liabilities under typi-
cal CGL policies. Such an analysis must involve a balancing of equities
between the broad cleanup policies of CERCLA and the intentions of the
contracting parties. Where insurance contracts do not include such lim-
iting measures as pollution exclusion clauses, insurance companies will
likely be responsible for those response costs incurred under CERCLA
which fall within the scope of the CGL policy.
Several authorities have expressed concern that such a result will lead
to a collapse of the insurance industry due to the extraordinary liabilities
imposed by CERCLA. Insurance companies would be liable for a great
deal of response costs incurred where pre-CERCLA insurance contracts
do not contain limiting language. Yet, by assuming such environmental
cleanup costs, the insurance industry would serve its function of ac-
cepting unexpected risks of the contracting parties. In the future, insur-
ance companies may include limiting provisions (i.e., absolute pollution
exclusion clauses) in their insurance policies and/or engage in the careful
analysis and supervision of the operations of their insureds. These prac-
tices would involve such measures as regular environmental auditing of
potential and actual insureds and other preventive investigative measures
before entering into insurance contracts. By taking such measures, the
insurance industry would engage in practices to adjust to the newly im-
posed environmental liabilities under CERCLA.
To protect appropriately the interests of all parties involved, the courts
should take an approach in this area which accommodates the national
public policies of CERCLA, and the contractual intentions of private
parties. Considering the enormous costs of CERCLA hazardous waste
cleanups to society and private parties, it is imperative that the courts
consider the national goals behind CERCLA when ruling on coverage
issues concerning CGL policies. In addition, the federal legislature
should be responsible for adopting legislation necessary to protect the
welfare of the insurance industry while it absorbs these significant liabili-
ties. The coordination of this effort between Congress and the courts
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would ensure the most cost efficient liability allocation under CERCLA
and aid in the quick, efficient cleanup of the hazardous waste sites across
the nation.

